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!
The Relationship between Access to Healthcare 
and Civil Conflict: 
An Exploratory Study 
!
This paper explores the role of health in explaining the onset and severity of 
civil conflict. Whereas most research in this field focuses primarily on the 
impact that conflict has on health, or that  disease and overall population 
health has on state stability and growth, I propose a new variable for 
consideration in this discussion: access to healthcare. This paper is the first in 
this field to explore the relationship between access to healthcare and the 
associated number and intensity of conflict events within states. I examine 
correlations between several healthcare and conflict indicators from ninety-
four administrative regions within African states, spanning a period from 1997 
to 2013. I find that results are mixed, but there are statistically significant 
relationships between accessibility, acceptability, accommodation, and social 
access elements of “access to healthcare” and the number and intensity of civil 
conflicts.  
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Introduction 
!!!!!!!
For over a decade, health issues have gained recognition and importance within security 
discourse. “In 2000, the United Nations Security Council discussed implications of the AIDS 
epidemic for global security, marking the first time in history that the body addressed a health 
issue.”  Around this time, the United States National Intelligence Estimate on the security 1
implications of global infectious diseases expressed that “these diseases will endanger U.S. 
citizenry at home and and abroad, threaten U.S. armed forces deployed overseas, and exacerbate 
social and political instability in key countries and regions in which the United States has 
significant interests.”   In the years since, scholars across the epidemiologic and political science 2
disciplines have articulated a need for “a fundamental reconceptualization of standard definitions 
of national and international security,”  and “more work on access to [health]care and 3
equity...financing mechanisms, resource allocation, regulation, public financial 
management...and incentives for health workers regarding health systems in conflict-ridden 
states.”  As recently as August 2013, tens of thousands of Spanish citizens and residents took to 4
the streets in protest after the government revoked its National Health System the year before.  5
The demand for greater investigation into the relationship between health and security is growing 
and must be addressed. Nevertheless, research on health systems in conflict-affected states tends 
to be piecemeal and small scale, and there is a dearth of policy-relevant insights and analyses.  6
 This thesis has three goals. The first is to examine the growing body of literature linking 
health and conflict. Most research in this arena focuses on the impact of conflict on health 
provision;  I am turning this question on its head to see whether health provision influences 7
conflict, and if so, how. I do so in response to the calls from scholars, journalists, and 
policymakers over the past decade which increasingly draw attention to the impact that public 
health provision has on national security.   The second is to propose that access to healthcare is 8
an important yet overlooked variable in this discussion. The original contribution of this thesis is 
its critical focus on access to healthcare, not just the prevalence of certain diseases or overall 
population health statistics. While the burden of disease can be a destabilizing factor which 
exacerbates conflict,  not all nations rife with infection are as prone to civil conflict as others. 9
Some nations have the capacity to offer health services to prevent disease and treat illness once it 
develops, while others do not. Yet, even in nations with developed health systems, not all 
individuals have equal access to potentially lifesaving medicine and medical care. This points to 
the third goal of this study: to test for empirical relationships between access to healthcare and 
the onset of civil conflict.  
 I propose that there is an inverse relationship between access to healthcare and the onset 
and intensity of domestic conflict. Scholars of civil conflict postulate that social grievances 
derived from feelings of relative deprivation of resources between distinct groups can incite civil 
conflict. As protection of health is a fundamental human right and an aspect of the human 
experience that must be preserved for individuals to lead full, quality lives, the lack of access to 
healthcare may be a strong enough motive for people to fight. I hypothesize that when access to 
healthcare is limited, social grievances arise in populations experiencing poor levels of health 
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resulting from unequal resource distribution. The relative deprivation in health and quality of life 
resulting from poor access to healthcare can create tension between those in poor health and 
those in good health, such that propensity for civil conflict increases. Another approach to the 
cause of civil conflict postulates that weak states who lack the capacity to fulfill their end of the 
social contract with their citizenry are more prone to civil conflict. If states cannot offer 
protection to their constituents from the threat to life posed by illness and infirmity through 
adequate healthcare services, they are not fulfilling their end of the social contract. Thus, 
individuals may engage in civil conflict to institute a new government which can successfully 
offer these services. These hypotheses follow the logic of relative deprivation and weak state 
theories to explore how varying levels of access to health and health care may be contributory 
causes for the onset of civil conflict.  
 Using data collected through the USAID Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) from the 
years 1997-2013, I identify indicators that proxy the level of access to healthcare within states at 
the administrative-regional level. These indicators allow me to focus on the “5 A’s of Access to 
Healthcare”: affordability, availability, accessibility, accommodation, and acceptability. 
Additionally, I examine indicators for social access that proxy levels of social customs and 
practices that may influence access to healthcare. I compare this health data with regional 
conflict data presented in the Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED). ACLED 
offers data both on the number of events occurring within administrative regions, coded by event 
type, as well as the number of fatalities associated with each conflict event. Because both DHS 
and ACLED data are coded at the subnational level, I am able to examine the impact of 
healthcare on both the number and intensity of civil conflicts that take place in the same region—
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a finer level of analysis than many studies that focus at the country-level. Due to the availability 
of data, I focus my final analysis on ten countries in Africa, which comprise a dataset containing 
a total number of observations representing 1598 region-years.  
 Initial matched-pairs correlations of each group of access indicators and variables 
representing the total number of conflicts, number of conflicts events by type, and number of 
fatalities suggest that access to healthcare is correlated with civil conflict at a statistically 
significant level. However, as I will show, these results are mixed. For some indicators of access 
to healthcare, lower levels of access are inversely correlated with the number of conflict events, 
whereas other are positively correlated. Further, the predictive ability that statistics for levels of 
access to healthcare have on the number of conflict events and related fatalities is also mixed. As 
we will see, attempts to model this relationship using pooled ordinary least squared (OLS), 
poisson, and negative binomial regression models produce inconclusive results regarding the 
empirical relationship between these two variables. I offer insights as to why these various 
models produce these varying results, as well as the merits and shortcomings of each approach. I 
then offer suggestions for future research into this question, before drawing overall conclusions 
about the contribution this study makes to the literature on health and civil conflict.  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Chapter 1: Literature Review  
!!!!!!!
This complex discussion requires bridging insight and analysis from two distinct fields of study: 
public health and national security. Thus, I divide this literature review into three sections. 
Section 1.1 describes the current state of health literature. I examine different facets of health—
health systems, population health and health service delivery—and draw insights about the role 
health plays in development and security. Section 1.2 shifts our focus to the large body of 
literature on the causes of domestic conflict and civil war. I examine the prominent hypotheses 
for the causes of conflict in this field and choose to situate my argument among the crop which 
offer macro-level explanations for the cause of civil conflict. I focus attention here because 
health and health care are operationalized and provided for primarily through state-level action; 
individual and non-governmental actions do not dictate national health policy, even if they can 
influence access to healthcare in other ways. Section 1.3 discusses the eminent arguments linking 
health to civil conflict. Finally, I draw upon insights from these bodies of literature to formulate 
and propose my hypotheses briefly, before a more thorough discussion of them in the next 
chapter.  
!
!
!
1.1 Health Literature as Related to Conflict 
!
History is rife with instances in which health, and the lack thereof, has shaped and altered human 
and military history. As noted by Peterson, disease burden during the Peloponnesian Wars 
demoralized the Athenian people, undermined political leadership, weakened the army and 
prevented it from achieving key military objectives.  Additionally, waves of influenza epidemics 10
have ravaged human populations, as they did in 1918 when it killed 25 million people, including 
500,000 Americans. In Spain, the same pandemic attacked nearly 300,000 allied troops, killing 
nearly 23,000 and causing significant problems on both allied and German sides during World 
War I.  Furthermore, “the spread of global HIV/AIDS continues to undermine state growth and 11
stability as it robs countries and their citizenries of their most productive years of life.”  Faced 12
with the challenges to both life and security caused by the growth and spread of epidemic 
disease, nations construct elaborate health systems to protect their populations.  
 In the sections which follow, I briefly discuss the political role of health systems as they 
have developed over time, and highlight some of the ways in which different systems produce 
different health and social outcomes. Next, I examine the impact that population health, as a 
product of health systems and other policies, has on state and economic growth. As state growth 
and stability have been shown to be important elements in explaining the causes of civil conflict, 
this link is extremely important to make. However, national level growth does not account for 
finer grain variation of socioeconomic factors and circumstances within states. Thus, I tighten 
my focus around the newly-emerging literature that examines intrastate variation regarding 
provision of health services. Settling here, I am able to highlight some of the potential sources 
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for social grievance that may predispose nations to more conflict, before moving on to the body 
of literature that seeks to explain the causes of conflict in the next portion of this literature 
review.  
 First, let us begin by discussing health systems. To date, scholars have focused 
extensively on the role of health systems as social institutions.  A health system refers to “all of 13
the activities whose primary purpose is to promote, restore and maintain health.”  These 14
activities may be entirely publicly (state) operated, privately organized, or a mixture of both. 
However, at their core, health systems “combine resources, organizations, and financing and 
management arrangements that ultimately culminate in the delivery of health services to a 
population.”  Such arrangements were first developed in Germany in 1883 when Otto von 15
Bismarck, the founder and first chancellor of the Wilhelmine Empire, instituted the world’s first 
compulsory system of national health insurance. In addition to being the first time in modern 
history that governing institutions organized and assisted in health provision for their citizens, 
the Bismarckian health system highlights the conceptualization of health provision as a 
politicized state service. In practice, this system was intended “to construct a social insurance 
system to forge a bond of loyalty between the worker and the authoritarian state, and to take the 
wind out of the rising socialist labor movement’s sails.”  Over the decades, models for health 16
systems have adapted and altered the Bismarckian model, but they all rely upon four principle 
functions: financing, purchasing (or resource allocation), service provision, and stewardship.   17
 Health systems are important starting points for the discussion of health’s role in conflict 
because different health systems place different burdens on individuals and governments in 
securing health. For instance, Guatemala’s health system receives very little funding from its 
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national government—only 1.9% of GDP is spent on health. As a result, roughly 40% of 
Guatemalans do not have ‘access’ to health care services or pensions, and most of these fall into 
the category of the poor or extreme poor. As recently as 2006, 17.9% of the population was faced 
with catastrophic spending on health care, meaning that out-of-pocket payment for health 
expenditures can push them below the poverty line.  A radically different health system in 18
Taiwan, universal coverage, has shown that the introduction of social health insurance 
(government sponsored) can substantially reduce the uncertainty surrounding out-of-pocket 
health expenditure, reduce the motives for precautionary saving, and even encourage 
consumption that contributes to economic growth.  This comes at a cost of approximately 6.6% 19
of GDP for the Taiwanese government. This rather crude comparison attempts to highlight the 
different outcomes that can arise from prioritization of different health systems, as well as 
indicate the potential benefits that can arise from national investment in health care. When 
populations are healthy, it follows that workers’ sustained and absolute productivity will be 
greater, thus contributing to greater economic growth. Additionally, stable populations are 
important for preserving national stability and the order upon which states rely to prevent civil 
disorder. These claims are validated by the growing research on health and economic growth.  
 For decades, economists have developed and refined models to capture the effects of 
different inputs on economic growth. Factors including education, infrastructure, governance, 
level of foreign investment,  work experience of labor the force,  and health, among others, 20 21
have been examined using various quantitative methodologies.  Both relative and absolute 22
improvements in health indicators, typically measured in terms of life expectancy gains, or 
reductions in infant or overall mortality, have a strong, significant, and positive impact on 
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economic growth, especially in the short run and in low- and middle-income countries.  It has 23
even been asserted that health is the most important determinant of economic growth.   24
 An examination of the impact of health on economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
OECD countries revealed that, even controlling for the endogeneity of investment in health as a 
byproduct of economic growth, the growth rate of per capita income (GDP/capita) is strongly 
and positively influenced by the stock of investment in health human capital. Gyimah-Brempong 
and Wilson, the authors of this study, demonstrate that 22 to 30 percent of annual income growth 
in Sub-Saharan Africa can be attributed to health, though the same cannot be said for OECD 
countries. GDP growth increases alongside gains in population-level health statistics, but at a 
decreasing rate in Sub-Saharan Africa. The authors suggest that a potential cause for this 
discrepancy in health-related economic growth may only exist in the short run, when investment 
in health is a relatively new venture for states. These results are echoed by case studies 
examining increased investment in population health in China,  India, Indonesia, Nepal, Sri 25
Lanka, Thailand,  and Sweden. The latter case study supports the postulations of Gyimah-26
Brempong and Wilson, revealing that health expenditure increases and associated population 
health improvements impact economic growth positively in the short run, but that growth tapers, 
levels off, and even becomes negative in the long run.  Nevertheless, some scholars still argue 27
that investment in human development, focusing especially on improving health, must remain a 
priority for states at all levels of development.  
!
!
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Even countries initially successful in both human development 
(HD) and economic growth (EG) will need to change their policies 
as development proceeds in order to sustain their success. In an 
early phase, priority should be given to primary education and 
some comprehensive health interventions, both from the 
perspective of improving HD and that of increasing EG. At a later 
stage, the roles of science and technology institutions and higher 
education become more important and hospitals assume a greater 
role than before.  28!
After a certain stage of development, provision of care deals more with promoting, protecting, 
and preserving well being, not just treating illness and infection.  No longer is health 29
conceptualized solely in terms of the absence of illness and disease. This shift in thought is 
exemplified in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where impressive 
gains achieved in health status, but only modest gains in economic growth,  due to 30
improvements in technology, health service delivery, public health programs and socioeconomic 
development have catalyzed epidemiological and demographic transitions that challenge 
traditional views of health. The MENA region is facing a dual burden of disease where rates of 
communicable disease (e.g. malaria, TB, HIV/AIDS) are decreasing, but remain higher than 
those in highly developed countries, and rates of non-communicable diseases (e.g. diabetes, heart 
disease, cancer) are increasing.  Demographically, trends of high birth and high death rates 31
across the MENA region are shifting to reflect changing social norms and health gains: both 
fertility and mortality rates are declining. However, as fertility rates are decreasing less rapidly 
than death rates, the MENA region is faced with a rapidly expanding youth population and a 
smaller growth rate in the aging population. In fact, over the past half-century, the MENA region 
has had the highest population growth in the world, second only to Sub-Saharan Africa.  32
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 The epidemiological and demographic transitions taking place in the MENA region are 
not unique. This region is a “latecomer” to the demographic transition as compared to nations of 
similar developmental status in east Asia and Latin America.  Nations experiencing shifts in the 33
eminent health challenges of their populations are forced to alter traditional health policies, 
divert public resources to reevaluate and revise the existing health system, and respond to 
increasing demand from their constituencies regarding “strong upward pressure on health 
spending—in terms of spending per head and total spending due to populations growth—that 
may well outpace economic growth rates.”  Such demand for more health services creates 34
opportunities for inefficient spending on health that may have negative impacts on economic 
growth and human capital development, “acting as a drag on labour productivity, adding fiscal 
pressure on limited government budgets, and reducing government’s ability to target public 
resources for vulnerable groups.”  These concerns echo the results of the studies by Gyimah-35
Brempong and Wilson, Li and Huang, Narayan, and Granados that long term impact of health 
investment may yield negative results. Yet research conducted by Alsan et al in 2005 seconds the 
assertions published in the 2001 WHO Report on the Commission of Macroeconomics and 
Health that a health workforce is important when attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). In 
examining FDI inflows to 74 low- and middle-income countries from 1980 to 2000, Alsan et al 
find that inflows are strongly and positively associated with population health, such that raising 
life expectancy by one year increases FDI by 9 percent in some instances, even when controlling 
for other factors such as education, infrastructure, income per capita, and quality of 
governance.  While FDI is not synonymous with economic growth, increased FDI inflows to 36
developing states imply that the recipient nation is growing into a lucrative business environment 
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that offers a productive and prosperous labor force.  The takeaway from the situation in the 37
MENA region and nations in similar developmental circumstances is that after a certain initial 
amount of investment in population health, health service delivery will need to be reconfigured 
to integrate the provision of preventative and promotion services.  
 According to World Bank analysts, many governments remain focused on expanding the 
infrastructure to meet the growing population without adequate attention to improving the 
efficiency or evaluating the appropriateness of investment in the current stock of technology.  It 38
is one thing to target public health challenges by “throwing money at the problem.” While pure 
financial investment in health and human capital has been shown to improve economic growth, 
and by extension state stability in low- and middle-income countries, the utility of this practice is 
often short-lived. Thus, scholars of public health have increased the attention paid to evaluating 
methods of service delivery and the challenges nations and health promoters face in trying to 
extend health resources and investments to the populations they are intended to aid most.  
 Inequalities in healthcare delivery have been studied extensively in developed countries, 
especially OECD nations,  but not until the last five to ten years have scholars focused attention 39
on equity of healthcare access in developing and conflict-affected states. Research indicates that 
heavy socioeconomic variables influence the accessibility of care in nations at all levels of 
development and security. A case study of access to healthcare in Palestine reveals that “the 
worse off do have a disproportionately greater need for all levels of care, but with the exception 
of primary level services, utilization of care appears to be significantly higher for the well off.”  40
In Afghanistan,  attempts to reduce inequalities in healthcare support this conclusion. Though the 
nationally organized Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) focuses on seven key areas of 
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health—maternal and newborn, child health and immunization, public nutrition, communicable 
diseases (especially TB and malaria), mental health disability, and essential drugs—Trani et al 
express that promoting health in Afghanistan means combating discrimination in the delivery of 
care and giving priority to populations with the greatest need: women, children, persons with 
disabilities, and those in most severe poverty, even though out-of-pocket expenditures are 
especially high for these vulnerable groups.  Similar outcomes are true even in conflict-free, 41
developed nations such as Japan. Since 1961, the government has provided universal health 
coverage through a national health insurance package offering many healthcare services, reduced 
copay and other welfare programs for the elderly. However, empirical analysis of actual 
healthcare use compared to healthcare need reveals that horizontal inequalities that favor the rich 
gradually increased with a widening health gap among the poor over the period of 1986-2007.  42
Further, Watanabe et al suggest that income and health status are big contributors to this gap. 
 The organization of health service delivery and the overall provision of healthcare is by 
no means standardized across countries, and can best be described as complicated. Developing 
and developed nations alike experience difficulty offering equitable delivery of healthcare 
services to their citizenries. Though scholars and policymakers have drawn attention to the 
importance of health for national growth and stability, different national capacities and policy 
priorities alter the ways in which health services are provided. These differences ultimately 
define and shape the ways in which nations organize their health systems and offer health 
services to fulfill a portion of the social contract they have with their constituencies. 
Nevertheless, provision of these state services may not always be equal, fair, or acceptable to 
individuals. As we will see in the next section, the capacity of states to provide for their 
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populations, as well as the frustrations that individuals may have resulting from poor provision 
of state services or undesirable social outcomes can be powerful motivations for people to 
engage in civil conflict.  
!
1.2 The Causes of Civil Conflict 
!
The prevalence of civil conflict in many low- and middle-income countries remains one of the 
most pressing security challenges of the modern age. Since 1945, three-quarters of all wars have 
been within countries rather than between them, and well over 40 million people have died as a 
result of violent civil conflict.  Additionally, about one third of the world’s population lives in 43
countries affected by significant political violence.  Rampant civil strife has dampened and even 44
derailed economic growth for many developing countries, and has the potential to undermine the 
stability of states at all levels of development. Fortunately, episodes of violent civil conflict have 
dropped in magnitude since the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the global presence of civil conflict 
remains quite high.  
 Research into the various causes of civil conflict has given rise to many theories that 
complement and challenge one another’s explanatory power. Some scholars focus their study on 
the individual-level motivations that lead people to engage in or abstain from civil conflict. 
Variables measuring economic deprivation (proxied by lack of education or income), forced 
participation, payment for allegiance, or social pressures to join a side indicate that elements of 
opportunity and social grievances contribute to individual actors’ decision to fight. However, 
these variables do not indicate which side an actor is likely to join if he or she chooses to engage 
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in civil conflict. Research into the case of the civil war in Sierra Leone helps clarify this 
ambiguity, at least in this specific case, by demonstrating that an individual’s relative economic 
or social status, the potential gains and losses to joining a military faction, and the strength of 
communal ties to a particular warring party each contribute understanding to why soldiers join 
the overall fight.   45
 Examinations of individuals’ motivations to engage in civil conflict, while an important 
piece of this puzzle, are not the best theories to explain how access to healthcare contribute to 
civil conflict. Because access to health and healthcare are measured at the population level, 
statistical data will not reflect individual motivations and preferences with fine enough detail to 
build upon existing micro-level hypotheses for the causes of conflict. Instead, I intend to situate 
this study among the existing macro-level  theories of civil conflict. Prevailing macro-level 46
research in to the causes of civil conflict which are most salient for examining the relationship 
between health and conflict approach the issue from two major paradigms: grievance 
explanations, and the weak state hypothesis. 
!
Grievance Explanations 
!
Political science research offers an account of conflict that focuses on motivations, rather than 
opportunities, for individuals to engage in civil conflict. At its core, the grievance argument 
proposes that individuals will engage in violent protest when frustrations escalate to such an 
acute degree that the status quo becomes unacceptable.   47
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 The first wide-ranging, empirical attempt to identify the causal relationship between 
grievances and civil strife was conducted by Ted Gurr. His argument centered around a 
psychological variable—relative deprivation—asserting that it is the basic precondition for civil 
strife of any kind. Relative deprivation refers to actors’ perceptions of discrepancy between the 
goods and conditions of life to which they believe they are justly entitled, and the amounts of 
those goods and conditions they think they are able to get and keep.  While grievances produced 48
by relative deprivation can be influenced by a number of intervening social variables such as the 
degree of political repression,  institutionalization of formal complaint mechanisms within the 49
bureaucracy, high social, economic, and/or educational inequality, past history of civil conflict 
(and related cultures of violence), and ethnic or religious cleavages,  their potential to incite 50
conflict remains.  Kahl notes that 
!
...as deprived individuals and social groups engage in increasingly 
fierce competition for dwindling resources, the deprivation 
hypothesis suggests that intergroup violence becomes more likely. 
Deprivation also increases the risk of rebellion against the state by 
encouraging individuals to support insurgents and other challenger 
groups seeking to overthrow the status quo.  51!
Simply put, “greater deprivation may increase the probability of social violence and political 
chaos.”  Early attempts to model grievance-based causes of conflict revealed that state 52
legitimacy has a causal relationship with civil strife independent of persisting or short-term 
episodes of deprivation or other intervening variables.  However, when compounded with the 53
effects of state legitimacy, “states of mind” conditions produced by short-term or persisting 
deprivation were seen to contribute significantly to the magnitude of civil strife. Later attempts 
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to understand the role of grievances in yielding civil conflict suggest the idea that objective and 
subjective well-being were not similarly related. Crosby introduced the concept of blame into the 
relative deprivation-conflict literature by arguing that resentment arises from an actor’s failure to 
possess something  that another actor, all other things equal, possessed. Working through feelings 
of envy over the missing possession, developing a feeling of entitlement to that possession, 
determining it is feasible to acquire the possession and deferring blame for not having the 
possession to something outside the self can produce frustrations and discontent strong enough to 
result in conflict.   54
 Most recently, Collier and Hoeffler juxtapose grievance-based approaches to civil conflict 
with another crop of “greed-based”  arguments in their article “Greed and Grievance in Civil 55
War”. Specifically, they study the impact that atypical opportunities for profit brought about by 
extortion of natural resources, donations from diasporas, and subventions from hostile 
governments have on inciting civil conflict. They also examine the effect that grievances derived 
from ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion and ethnic dominance, 
and economic inequality have on predicting the onset of 79 large scale civil conflicts between 
1960 and 1999.   They conclude that economic indicators contributing to the greed-based theory 56
of civil conflict have statistically significant causal relationships in predicting civil conflict, 
whereas examined indicators for grievances are too common among both those countries rife 
with civil conflict and those without any at all to wield much explanatory power. Nevertheless, 
they note that just because those aspects of heterogeneity they tested do not predict conflict, it 
does not mean that grievances are irrelevant in explaining civil strife. In fact, scholars such as 
Luis Medina assert that previous attempts to model grievances’ impact on civil conflict to date 
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have been based on the wrong assumptions, and that arguments that grievances are not associated 
with conflict are incorrect; rather, the relationship is inconclusive.  
  
Weak State Hypothesis 
!
The crux of the weak state hypothesis is that strong and capable states are able to prevent 
grievances and social turmoil within their borders from coalescing into organized violence. 
Traditional means through which states pacify civil strife include, inter alia, “offering a mix of 
relief for aggrieved individuals, co-optation of opposition leaders, and outright coercion”  as 57
well as state provision of public goods like law enforcement, health services and protection of 
rights and liberties. The ability of nations to successfully repress dissident movements, or to 
redistribute resources to aggrieved groups reflect the administrative capacity of the state. “In the 
civil conflict literature, interest in state capacity has coincided with a turn away from debate over 
motive” —greed and grievance hypotheses—to put states at the center of the discussion 58
regarding causes of civil conflict. Attempts to operationalize state capacity, however, have taken 
different turns and emphasized different elements of this rather nebulous concept.  
 State capacity, defined as one country’s ability to maximize its prosperity and stability, to 
exert de facto and legislative control over its territory, to protect its population from predation, 
and to adapt to diverse crises relates well to the weak state explanation of civil conflict,  is 59
often evaluated in terms of “military capacity, bureaucratic and administrative capacity, and 
political/institutional coherence and quality.”  Military capacity refers to a state’s ability to deter 60
or combat challenges to its authority through the use of force. The unit of analysis here tends to 
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be the national military and related indicators of its strength and power (e.g. military personnel 
per capita). Empirical examinations of military capacity and civil conflict find that “greater 
military capacity is associated with lower likelihood of onset, higher likelihood of termination, 
and shorter duration of war.”  Alternatively, greater spending on military affairs as part of GDP 61
has been argued to present opportunities for corruption and favoritism of military communities, 
which can lead to the evolution of social grievances.   62
 Bureaucratic and administrative capacity refers to the state’s ability to extend its authority 
and resources into the far reaches of its territory to collect and manage information. Scholars 
focus their study of administrative capacity on bureaucratic quality--the evaluation of a state’s 
regular, meritocratic recruitment and advancement processes, or lack thereof.  Another approach 63
to bureaucratic and administrative capacity focuses on the ability of states to extract resources 
from their citizenries. This operationalization derives from the dearth of literature observing links 
between economic development in strong states and strong market economies. It identifies weak 
states as “hopelessly poor” and “unable to maintain basic economic functions and raise the 
revenue required to deliver basic services to their citizens.”  The extant research on state 64
capacity and conflict shows that “political instability and high risk of conflict are clustered in the 
data with weak states and low levels of economic development.”  States weakened by poor 65
bureaucratic and administrative capacities are likely to experience conflict because they cannot 
organize government resources to put down rebellion  or because insurgents face a lower 66
opportunity cost to fighting when the state’s ability to respond is impotent.  67
 Political/institutional coherence and quality refers to the degree to which democratic and 
non-democratic features are intermingled in the political system. The Polity index is typically 
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used to operationalize this concept. The assertion that institutional coherence matters for state 
stability is supported by empirical evidence that “mixed regimes, or ‘anocracies’ which are 
neither fully democratic or authoritarian are most likely to experience internal conflicts.”  States 68
in between egalitarian and repressive regimes on a spectrum often have less ability to repress or 
accommodate dissidents to stave off conflict from erupting.  
 The weak state hypothesis offers a nice alternative approach to civil conflict insofar as it 
offers a more tangible way to operationalize the “state” as a unit whose actions can influence the 
probability of conflict onset and its duration. Thus, recommendations for improving state 
strength based on national-level policies become relatively easier to deliver and express than 
recommendations to address individual grievances or economic motivations. However, these two 
explanations for civil conflict are closely related in practice. It is logical that states with low 
capacity to govern their constituencies will not be able to offer the state services (e.g. education, 
opportunities for stable employment, law enforcement and protection, health services, etc.) that 
will keep people happy. Thus, poor state capacity is closely linked with high levels of social 
grievance, and vice versa.  
!
1.3 Health & Civil Conflict 
!
To date, empirical studies examining the effect of health related variables on the onset and 
duration of civil conflict  are few and far between. Within this small, but growing body of 69
literature, attention has been paid primarily to the impact that burden of disease has on inter- and 
Rohde !20
intra-state conflict. One of the early investigations into the impact of infectious disease on civil 
conflict was conducted by Andrew Price-Smith.  
 In his book, The Health of Nations, Price-Smith argues that proliferation of infectious 
disease poses a quantifiable and serious threat to national and inter-state security. In examining 
the socio-economic effects that disease outbreaks have wrought on states of varying stability 
throughout history, he demonstrates how incidences of increased disease prevalence can 
contribute to reduced economic prosperity, decreased latent power of states, and ultimately 
increased state fragility. He employs both statistical analysis and process tracing to define the 
relationships that exist between disease and indicators of state capacity.  70
 He hypothesizes that “increasing levels of infectious disease exert a negative effect on 
state capacity, such that increases in disease prevalence result in correspondingly diminishing 
values of state capacity.”  Because state capacity is an abstract concept, Price-Smith chooses 71
five indicators to serve as proxies for overall state capacity based on their ability to address 
certain attributes of the dependent variable which reflect the “primacy of fungible economic 
power,” and thus, the importance of human capital for ensuring security.  These are gross 72
national product (per capita), government expenditure, school enrollment ratio (secondary), net 
long-term capital inflow and military spending per soldier (per capita). Measures for evaluating 
the prevalence of infectious disease burden are infant mortality (IM, per 1000 children)  and life 73
expectancy (LX, in years at birth).  74
 Looking at data from 1950 through 1990, Price-Smith examines 20 randomly selected 
countries across six continents at various levels of socio-economic development and illustrates 
quantitatively how there is a consistent and strongly negative correlation between infant 
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mortality and state capacity, and that there is a positive association between life expectancy and 
state capacity at state, regional and global levels.  He concludes that as prevalence of disease 75
increases (demonstrated by rising IM) state capacity declines while an increase in life expectancy 
indicates a rise in state capacity. 
 Another crucial study in the literature on disease and conflict examines the impact of 
HIV/AIDS prevalence on inter- and intra-state conflict. Peterson and Shellman recognize 
arguments that “AIDS may create direct incentives and opportunities for civil and international 
conflict in the hardest hit countries,” but suggest “it is more likely to create disincentives for 
conflict by depleting morale and military capability.”  They focus their study on the impact that 76
HIV/AIDS has on states’ political institutions and economic health as essential elements of 
national security. Through empirical analysis, Peterson and Shellman find that increased HIV/
AIDS prevalence is negatively associated with prevalence of violent conflict within states, and 
that this effect is even more pronounced in international conflicts.   77
 Taking a rather innovative approach to the cause of civil war, Baten and Mumme 
published a quantitative study examining absolute and relative economic deprivation’s impact on 
the onset of civil wars between 1816 and 1999 by operationalization deprivation through unique 
indicators—nutritional well being and median male height. Largely influenced by the health 
literature and anthropometric methods, they decided to use these measures to examine the 
grievance hypothesis of civil war. They find that relative deprivation and related inequalities 
within populations exert a strong and consistent propensity to start civil wars during this time 
period. They also find that economic deprivation has a negative impact on the probability of civil 
war onset, but their results do not remain significant when tested for high levels of robustness. 
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 Drawing insights from these three bodies of literature, it seems that there are plausible 
pathways through which access to healthcare can contribute to greater national stability. Namely, 
improved population health can reduce social grievances as burdens of disease and illness 
decrease, and as gains in national economic growth trickle down to the household level. 
Investment in health and subsequent gains in population health—measured through health 
outcomes such as life expectancy and infant mortality—have also been shown to produce gains 
in economic growth even after controlling for the endogeniety of investment in health as a 
product of state growth. Additionally, delivery of healthcare services reflects a state’s ability to 
protect its citizenry from the threat to life posed by illness and infirmity; poor healthcare reflects 
the weakness of a state’s administrative capacity. Thus, states with poor capacity are associated 
with a higher propensity for civil conflict because they cannot organize resources to pacify 
dissenting populations through oppression or distribution of appropriate resources (e.g. 
healthcare).  
 Building on these arguments, I propose that there is an inverse relationship between 
access to healthcare and civil conflict. As states provide more services in the form of healthcare 
delivery, this may improve per capita income, educational and employment opportunities, and 
even social equality. As a result, populations would likely experience less intra-group tension and 
frustrations which may, if intense enough, erupt into conflict. Further, if poor access to healthcare 
depletes population health and stability, we may expect to see a rise in conflict as institutions and 
social order begin to dissipate. Thus, I anticipate that states experiencing higher levels of access 
to healthcare should experience lower levels of conflict, while states with poor healthcare access 
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should experience the opposite. Before diving into my argument, however, I  would like to call 
attention to a few vignettes which illustrate the relationship between healthcare and conflict.  
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Chapter 2: Preliminary Support?  
Observing social tensions surrounding healthcare in three countries  !!!!!!!
Proposing a new argument for discussion within a growing body of literature is an exiting 
process. That said, there is always the small concern when conducting exploratory research that 
the question being posed only addresses a niche issue. However, if recent events regarding 
healthcare access and civil conflict as recently as 2012 in China and Spain, and 2014 in the 
Dominican Republic are any indication, the conversation started in this paper may have 
significant implications for policymakers and state officials in the future. Together, these three 
vignettes exemplify the consequences that provision of poor healthcare services and the 
restriction of access to healthcare can have on populations in terms of civil conflict. They offer 
additional observational support for some of the arguments discussed in the literature linking 
healthcare to conflict via through weak state and grievance hypotheses, and further inform the 
argument that I propose in the following section.  
!
!
!
!
!
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2.1 AIDS Scandal, China 2012 
!
In 2012, citizens of China’s Henan province stormed government buildings in the regional 
capital demanding compensation and medical packages after a botched blood-transfusion scheme 
came to light. Improper handling of biological materials collected in blood-selling clinics, 
common operations in many rural Chinese villages such as those in Henan province, are the 
ultimate source of this conflict. Through these clinics, Chinese health officials would collect 
blood from willing patients, extract the plasma from it for use in transfusions or other 
procedures, and put the remaining fluid in common collection tanks before replenishing the 
blood in donors. In an effort to expedite this process, blood was not tested for communicable 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS or other transmissible illnesses, and thousands of participants in this 
program were infected as a result.  
 In August of 2012, “about 300 Chinese AIDS patients and their relatives stormed and tore 
down the main gate of the Henan provincial government, prompting a baton attack by local 
police.”  This eruption of civil violence came as a direct response to the revelation that an 78
estimated 100,000 people in Henan province alone had been infected with HIV through spread of 
contaminated blood collected through botched blood-selling schemes. Of the nearly 100,000 
infected individuals known to be infected by this scheme, at least 40,000 were reported to have 
died as a result of the HIV/AIDS they contracted through bad administration of blood 
transfusions and improper handling of blood at health clinics.   79
 Activists told reporters that they tried to file lawsuits against the Chinese government, 
demanding compensation, as well as medical and welfare packages for those families whose 
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members became infected with HIV or who died as a result of the disease, but that the “Henan 
government [would not] let them.”  Frustrated by the lack of accountability of the government, 80
the unfulfilled promises of aid packages for HIV treatments for children infected through mother 
to child transmissions of the disease, and the revelation that an estimated 10,000 clinics operating 
this same, unsafe scheme were still in operation, the Chinese people were moved to demonstrate. 
The government did little to respond to these protesters’ demands. Children who lost parents to 
HIV as a result of this scheme are receiving a stipend of only $95 a month,  and activists who 81
rallied protesters and petitioned the government for compensation in 2012 have been banned 
from Henan province, if not arrested for being there, as recently as November of 2013.   82
 The efforts of the Chinese government to quash investigations into this scandal have only 
exacerbated the social and political problems begun by a provision of bad healthcare services. 
Though this issue is clearly related to other issues of corruption and ethical misconduct, it 
exemplifies the political nature of health service delivery, as well as the potential that poor 
management of health programs and limited access to treatment can have for inciting civil 
conflict through protest and violent demonstration.  
!
2.2 Revocation of the National Health System, Spain 2012 
!
On April 20, 2012, the Spanish government approved the transition from a National Health Care 
system (NHS) to an insurance model through a Royal Decree-Law, bypassing the need for 
parliamentary discussion.  Overnight, universal healthcare access, an immensely popular right 83
with social and political impacts guaranteed by NHS, vanished. This single decision stripped 
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hundreds of thousands of non-citizen residents of their right to healthcare. Though policymakers 
asserted that the shift was intended to lessen the burden of rampant medical tourism borne by the 
state, the consequences have proven dire for certain vulnerable groups. Namely, immigrants and 
migrant workers in Spain find themselves without basic access to preventative or primary 
healthcare. Except for emergency services and maternal care, residents in Spain without national 
citizenship now lack access to the reliable, quality guarantee of health services they were 
accustomed to for years under the NHS. 
 This new reality is proving to be costly, in both financial and human terms, as 
demonstrated by the case of one laborer who died of tuberculosis (TB) after multiple denials of 
care, less than one month after the policy change.  In investigating this case, it came to light that 84
the same hospital that had previously cared for this man also diagnosed and subsequently denied 
care to eight additional patients with TB because they no longer qualified for medical care 
outside of the NHS. This new health system is failing many of Spain’s residents who were 
perviously covered under NHS because the new eligibility criteria for access to care are 
extremely exclusive. 
 Beyond the social and personal costs induced by the health system change, the Spanish 
government faced the growing frustrations and opposition of the policy change by the public. In 
December of 2012, thousands of Spanish medical workers and residents, angered by the budget 
cuts and plans to privatize health care, took to the streets in protest. The “white tide,” nearly 
25,000 protestors dressed in white scrubs, represented a growing conflict between thousands of 
Spaniards whose desire for universal access to health care conflicts with national policy.  These 85
protests continued to receive international attention, making splashes in U.S. media outlets as 
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recently as February of 2013.  Reporters covering the protests convey the concern felt by 86
numerous Spanish residents that the change in policy away from NHS reflects motivations 
within the government that are not aligned with the best interests of those people living and 
working in Spain. As, all other things equal, the drop in access to healthcare has moved tens of 
thousands of individuals to pressure the government to revert to there former status quo of 
healthcare, this instance again suggests that access to healthcare is a significant enough motive to 
prompt civil conflict. 
!
2.3 Restrictions on Citizenship and Related Social Services, Dominican Republic 2013 
!
This extremely recent development in the Dominican Republic concerns changes in citizenship 
rights for Dominicans of Haitian descent. A ruling in October of 2013 by the Dominican 
Republic’s Constitutional Court revokes citizenship rights for thousands of former citizens of the 
island nation, many of whom are of Haitian descent. This ruling has incensed an international 
response by many Dominican and Haitian emigrants who are outraged by the ongoing tension 
between Dominicans and Haitians living and working in the Dominican Republic. This ruling, 
applies to any citizen born after 1929, rendering nearly 210,000 former citizens stateless.   87
 In the immediate term, many residents of the Dominican Republic are now ineligible to 
access social programs and services that were available to them before the ruling—namely, 
public education, healthcare services, even getting a passport to travel.  Outrage over this ruling 88
even incited protests in Miami, Florida and New York City, New York where large Dominican 
and Haitian diasporas have gathered over the years. In October, protesters gathered in the states 
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to support their fellow Haitians in the Dominican Republic in protesting the court's decision and 
the resulting exclusion of social services that comes with it. As this situation continues to unfold 
and tensions rise, it will be interesting to see how the change in access to publicly provided 
programs aggravates existing tensions between Haitians migrants, Dominicans of Haitian 
descent, and non-Haitian Dominican citizens. Again, this example presents an opportunity to 
examine how changes in access to social programs, including healthcare, influence civil unrest. 
!
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Chapter 3: Access to Healthcare and Civil Conflict 
!!!!!!!!
In this section, I assert for the first time in the literature that access to healthcare is an important 
variable in the conversation concerning the causes of civil conflict. If the situations previously 
discussed offer even the slightest indication, healthcare can play a powerful role in prompting 
civil strife. Again, I argue that there is an inverse relationship between access to healthcare and 
the onset and severity of civil conflict within states. The causal mechanisms through which 
access to healthcare can lead to conflict are social grievances and/or diminished state capacity. In 
its simplest form, my argument takes the following form, as illustrated in Figure 1. In order to 
investigate the relationship between access to healthcare and civil conflict empirically, I must 
define and operationalize access to healthcare  and civil conflict, and discuss the merits and 
shortcomings of this approach within the context of the current literature. 
FIGURE 1: ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE & CIVIL CONFLICT 
!
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3.1 Access to Healthcare 
!
When we typically thinks of access to healthcare, we immediately think of access to the doctors, 
facilities and treatments necessary to protect, preserve, and regain health. These are the elements 
of health systems that people interact with directly when concerns about their health arise. 
However, access to healthcare extends beyond these infrastructural units. Following the 
methodology employed by the US Agency for International Development, access to healthcare 
can be dissected into and measured through six areas—the five “A’s of Access,” and social 
access.  In Table 1, I define and describe each element of access to healthcare, as well as offer 89
indicators I can use to measure each facet of access. 
!
TABLE 1 
USAID INDICATORS: ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE
Element of Access Definition Indicators Code
AFFORDABILITY
The ability and willingness 
of patients to pay for 
services provided
Cost as a Perceived Barrier* costbarr
Percent of Population with Insurance 
Coverage inscover
AVAILABILITY
Do healthcare providers 
possess the technology and 
personnel to meet the 
needs of patients
Concern about there not a provider at the 
facility* crnoprov
Concern about there not being medication 
at the facility* crnomeds
ACCESSIBILITY Geographic accessibility
Distance to a facility* dist
Needing to seek transport to get to a 
facility* trans
ACCOMMODATI
ON
The extent to which 
healthcare providers meet 
the constraints and 
preferences of patients
Number of physicians per 1,000 population phys
Number of hospital beds per 10,000 
population beds
ACCEPTABILITY
The degree to which 
patients are comfortable or 
uncomfortable with 
healthcare providers
Concern about there not being a female 
medical provider at a facility* crnofem
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!
3.2 Civil Conflict 
!
Civil war, the most widely examined facet of civil conflict in the extant literature, is concerned 
primarily with the number of direct battle deaths resulting from a violent conflict episode within 
a state. While civil wars often attract the most international attention, other variations of civil 
conflict have been addressed in the literature. Kahl investigates civil strife—large-scale, 
sustained and organized violent conflict within a country. Per this definition, civil strife includes 
instances of revolution, rebellion, insurgency, civil and ethnic war, and sustained campaigns of 
terrorism.  An even broader definition of civil conflict includes instances of internal violence, 90
riots, protests, crime and large scale international violent conflict. Although civil war is the most 
intensely studied variant of civil conflict, it is important to identify measures of civil conflict 
beyond battle deaths caused by civil war. As scholars understand better the causal factors for the 
onset and duration of civil wars, it will become increasingly important for researchers to identify 
methods to curb and remedy smaller-scale civil conflicts as well. 
SOCIAL ACCESS
Social norms and customs 
that influence a patient’s 
ability to seek healthcare
Needing Permission to Seek Healthcare* permission
Who has final say over health decisions** decision
Concern about going alone to healthcare 
facility* crgoalone
*Coded such that a higher score indicates that this is more of a problem when seeking 
healthcare 
**Coded such that a higher score indicates more autonomy in decision-making about 
healthcare needs
TABLE 1 
USAID INDICATORS: ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE
Element of Access Definition Indicators Code
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 I draw from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED) and adopt their 
definition and coding of conflict events for this study. Quoted from the dataset codebook, 
“ACLED definitions mainly concern actors and events. ACLED collects and codes reported 
information on political violence from the developing world on civil and communal conflicts, 
violence against civilians, rioting and protesting. ACLED covers activity that occurs within the 
context of a civil war, and violent activity that occurs outside of civil wars, particularly violence 
against civilians, militia interactions, communal conflict and rioting…ACLED recognizes a 
range of actors including governments, rebels, militias, ethnic groups, active political 
organizations, and civilians.”  Thus, I operationalize conflict by including events short of and 91
including civil war. This data allows me to examine the number of conflict events, coded by 
event type (e.g. non-violent event, riot/protest, battle), as well as the number of fatalities 
associated with each event. These two statistics offer me the ability to examine the impact that 
access to healthcare has on both the number and intensity of conflict events in countries observed 
in this paper. In Table 2, I present the elements of conflict I focus on in my study, their working 
definition, and the indicator computed from ACLED for use during my quantitative analysis.  
!
TABLE 2 
ACLED INDICATORS: CIVIL CONFLICT
Element of Conflict Definition Indicators Code
NUMBER OF 
CONFLICTS
Aggregate number 
of conflict events, 
per region, per 
year
The total number of all conflict events, regardless of 
type, per region, per year in ACLED numconf
NUMBER OF NON-
VIOLENT 
CONFLICT 
EVENTS
Aggregate number 
of non-violent 
conflict events, 
per region, per 
year
The total number of all conflict events coded 5 (non-
violent activity by a conflict actor) or 8 (non-violent 
transfer of territory), per region, per year in ACLED 
ctype11
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3.3 Controls 
!
!
Obviously when creating models to explain the causes of civil conflict, there are certain factors 
that must be controlled for. The literature suggests that low levels of health and healthcare access 
may be a contributory cause for civil conflict, but they are in no way the only factors that have 
been studied and shown to have a statistically significant impact in predicting this social 
phenomenon. In the post-Cold War literature, explorations into the causes of civil war rely 
heavily on cross-national statistical analyses of civil conflict events to identify characteristics of 
countries most affected by civil conflict. In an exhaustive survey of the empirical work done in 
this field, James Fearon reviews the statistically significant predictors for conflict that have been 
established in the literature. Namely variations in youth bulge as a percentage of national adult 
population, equitable income distribution, ethnic fractionalization, presence of ethnically 
excluded political groups, poor human rights performance, mountainous terrain, primary 
NUMBER OF 
VIOLENT, NON-
BATTLE EVENTS
Aggregate number 
of violent conflict 
events, per region, 
per year
The total number of all conflict events coded 4 
(headquarters or base established), 6 (riots/protests), or 
7 (violence against civilians), per region, per year in 
ACLED 
ctype12
NUMBER OF 
BATTLE EVENTS
Aggregate number 
of battle events, 
per region, per 
year
The total number of all conflict events coded 1 (battle
—no change of territory), 2 (battle—non-state actors 
overtake territory), or 3 (battle—government regains 
territory), per region, per year in ACLED 
ctyope13
NUMBER OF 
FATALITIES
Aggregate number 
of fatalities per 
region, per year 
resulting from 
conflict events
The total number of all casualties resulting from 
conflict events regardless of type, per region, per year 
in ACLED 
fatalities
TABLE 2 
ACLED INDICATORS: CIVIL CONFLICT
Element of Conflict Definition Indicators Code
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commodity exporting practices (e.g. oil, conflict minerals) and perhaps greater gender inequality 
contribute to the likelihood for violent civil conflict to begin or endure for longer periods in 
many low- and middle-income states.  Other indicators such as highest level of education have 92
been used to proxy economic deprivation and level of absolute welfare, as level of education can 
indicate prospects for future employment or economic successes.  For this investigation, I select 93
the controls outlined in Table 3. The control variable, definition, indicator and rationale are 
outlined below.  
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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TABLE 3 
CONTROL VARIABLES
Control Definition Indicator Code
Percentage of 
Population Living in 
Rural Areas
National estimate 
of citizens living in 
rural areas, percent
UN Data. Population, Percent 
Rural (%) prural
Percentage of 
Households with 
Access to Electricity
Average estimate 
of households with 
access to 
electricity, percent, 
by region
USAID survey data, access to 
electricity. Self-computed 
statistic.*
electric
Highest Level of 
Educational 
Achievemtn
Average estimate 
of the highest level 
of education 
attained, by region
USAID survey data, highest 
level of educational 
achievement. Self-computed 
statistic.*
edu
Level of Ethnic 
Fractionalization
National estimate, 
the probability that 
two randomly 
drawn individuals 
are from different 
ethnoliguistic 
groups.
Replication data from Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003, “Ethnic and 
Cultural Diversity by Country”
efrac
Level of Democracy
National score for 
measure of regime 
type and level of 
democracy
Polity IV Project. Ranges from 
-10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full 
democracy).
polity
Income per capita
Level of national 
gross domestic per 
person in the 
population, by 
yearproduct
UN Data. GDP/capita, current 
$U.S. prices gdpcap
Level of Equality of 
Resource Distribution
National statistic 
measuring equality 
of resource 
distribution within 
the population
UN Data. GINI coefficient gini
* Coded such that a higher score means higher regional average (e.g. 
higher access to electricity, higher level of schooling)
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3.4 Causal Mechanism 
!
I propose that the elements of access to healthcare will influence the number of and intensity of 
civil conflicts as depicted below in Figure 2. I intend to isolate each element of access in order to 
identify which portion, if any, presents a statistically significant relationship to the level of civil 
conflict occurring in that area.   
FIGURE 2: CAUSAL MECHANISM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!
 
!
!
Again, the channels through which access to healthcare impacts civil conflict are by exacerbating 
social grievances such that conflict erupts and/or undermining the stability of the state, its 
institutions, and its ability to maintain order within its territory. The extant literature on health 
and conflict suggests that social grievances due to loss of loved ones from chronic illness can be 
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extremely taxing psychologically and financially for many families. This is especially true when 
the families impacted by illness are lower-income, as suggested by Price-Smith. In these 
instances, the frustration and anger associated with losing a loved one, especially if it is due to 
diseases for which there are good medication and treatments can provoke people to challenge the 
status quo. Alternatively, if population health is chronically at low levels due to high levels of 
disease or poor state growth, this can diminish the ability of the state to raise revenue and 
provide the services such as infrastructural development, rule of law, and welfare programming 
its citizens demand. In these instances, groups may be compelled to replace the regime in power 
in favor of a more competent one.  
 While a dearth of research has been done that examines population-level health statistics 
(e.g. life expectancy, infant mortality) and civil conflict, the critical element of this study focuses 
on access to healthcare. Population health metrics are important units of analysis; they are often 
more readily availably data, and reach further back in time than healthcare metrics. However, 
much of the variation in access to healthcare within states could potentially explain why 
population health metrics are as high, or low, as they are in some nations. Understanding the 
impact that this variation can have on conflict in localized region may help guide policymakers 
in their decision-making processes when it comes to planning health interventions or choosing 
whether or not to support health campaigns. If, through this analysis, a statistically significant 
link can be established between access to healthcare and civil conflict, it will add an additional 
element to the literature on causes of conflict and help direct future research in this direction.  
 This research question is not without flaws, however. Understandably, access healthcare 
will be impacted by conflict going on in the regions where data is collected. This complicates the 
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validity and reliability of the statistics I will use. Further, healthcare is closely linked to 
population health—why depart from the norm and focus on an even smaller element of overall 
national health? In practice, I believe that focusing on healthcare will prove a much more 
tangible and practical way to offer recommendations to policymakers. Health is a nebulous 
concept, with varying definitions. In some circles, health means medical health, where in others 
it is more of a holistic concept. Moreover, others conceptualize health in terms of well-being or 
in terms of adjustment to the environment.  It is often something that journalists and 94
policymakers can refer to, but when it comes time to operationalize it, it is much less clear how 
to do so. Focusing on access to healthcare can help mitigate this challenge. Healthcare is 
concerned with the tangible elements of health systems. It is concerned with the units patients 
interact with. Understanding better the role these components play in causing (or dampening) 
civil conflict will improve the ability of scholars and government officials to target the causes of 
conflict and prevent future disturbances from occurring. 
!
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Chapter 4: Hypotheses and Data 
!!!!!!!!
I propose the following hypotheses to test: 
!
H1a: There is no statistical relationship between access to healthcare within an administrative 
region and the total number of conflicts witnessed in that unit. 
This defines the null hypotheses that all regressions for this response variable will test against.  
H1b: The higher the level of access to healthcare within an administrative region, the lower the 
total number of conflicts witnessed in that unit of analysis will be. 
Higher levels of healthcare access should, following the logic of the grievance argument, resolve 
frustrations that individuals have about provision of health services. Following the state 
capacity theory, better access to healthcare can contribute to better population health 
which is important for economic growth and long term national stability.  
!
H2a: There is no statistical relationship between access to healthcare within a unit of analysis 
and the total number of fatalities due to conflict events witnessed witnessed in that 
administrative region. 
This defines the null hypotheses that all regressions for this response variable will test against. 
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H2b: The higher the level of access to healthcare within a unit of analysis, the lower the total 
number of fatalities due to conflict events witnessed in that administrative region will be. 
Higher levels of access to healthcare should decrease the number of deaths resulting from 
conflict events within the same unit of analysis. On one hand, better access should make 
it easier to seek and receive medial care in the event someone falls ill. On another hand, 
areas where there are better access to healthcare may see less conflict because citizens are 
happy with the status quo, and thus, do not engage in fighting as much as low access 
areas. 
For my explanatory variables, the elements of access to healthcare, I use USAID’s Demographic 
Health Surveys (DHS).  DHS data are nationally-representative and provide a wealth of 95
indicators for issues related to population demographics, health and nutrition. They are 
conducted approximately every five years within states, and each sample size contains roughly 
5,000 to 30,000 household interviews. All of the interviews, regardless of country or region of 
origin, are coded using a standardized methodology to allow for cross-country comparisons and 
comparisons over time. An important element of the DHS data is that individual surveys are 
coded at the administrative-regional level. This aligns well with the coding of the ACLED data 
insofar as I can compare access to healthcare indicators to conflict events at the subnational 
level. 
 The questions that target access to healthcare were initially asked in DHS surveys 
beginning in 1997 and continue to the present day. As such, I have to limit the initial pool of 
countries from which I can draw observations to only those African nations which have two 
surveys conducted from 1997 to 2013. The reason I limit the region to Africa alone is that 
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ACLED data is only collected for African countries. While I could use other datasets, ACLED 
provides the most compatibility of conflict data with health data without having to employ GIS 
or other spatial modeling methods. I use the individual recode files to populate health statistics in 
my panel of data. For the two accommodation indicators (number of physicians and number of 
hospital beds), DHS does not collect data on these at the subnational level. Instead, I collected 
statistics from the World Health Organization’s Global Health Observatory Data Repository to 
populate statistics for those indicators in my data panel. 
 For the response variables, conflict data, I use the Armed Conflict Location & Event 
Dataset.  Again, this data provides information on the number of specific conflict events by 96
type, regional location, and the associated number of fatalities that corresponds to the conflict. 
This allows me to examine the number and intensity of civil conflicts at the subnational level 
over time. Because DHS surveys only asked questions about access to healthcare indicators from 
1997-2013, I truncated the ACLED data to include events from within that time period. 
Obviously, there are limitations to this data. As it is collected in conflict-affected states, there 
may not always be the most precise recording of the number of fatalities resulting from a conflict 
event, and the exact location or timing of the event may be off by a bit. However, I do not need 
that precise information at least for this exploratory study. The one drawback is that riot and 
protest events are aggregated into one event type. Riots are typically characterized by violent 
demonstration, whereas protests are peaceful, per the ACLED codebook.  While I computed 97
grouped statistics for the number of conflict events by type (e.g. non-violent; violent, non battle; 
battle) this inflates the number of violent-non battle events because protests/riots included in this 
category. In fact, there may be a majority of peaceful protests in that category, but without 
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intensely scrubbing the data and recoding thousands of events, it would be impossible to separate 
that original coding successfully. Therefore, I populated my data panel using the number of 
fatalities per administrative region (Admin_1) per year, alongside the aggregate number of 
conflict events (sum of all; sum by type) which I self-computed.  
 Many of the questions asked in the DHS survey were presented in the following way: 
Would you describe needing money to get medical care as 0) not a problem, 1) a big problem, or 
2) a small problem? Coding of responses in this way is not particularly useful for me to analyze. 
Therefore, I recoded responses for each question following this format on a scale of 0-10, 0 
being “no problem”, 5 being a “small problem” and 10 being a “big problem.” Then, I averaged 
the responses to each question for each administrative region where data was collected by DHS 
to generate a mean score for each indicator for the year the survey was conducted. DHS also 
offered information regarding level of education and access to electricity at the subnational level, 
which I averaged in a similar way to the health indicator data. However, I note that electricity 
scores fall on a range from zero to one (zero meaning zero percent of the region has access to 
electricity, one means one-hundred percent has access), and that educational level takes a score 
of zero to three (zero is no education, one is primary education, two is secondary education and 
three is higher than secondary education). I populated these regional averages alongside the 
conflict data I pulled from ACLED. 
 The next important issue to note regarding this data is that some values were missing 
between years. As DHS does not collect and publish surveys for every year, not all countries had 
good data to use for a quantitative study. Therefore, I narrowed my selection of countries and 
administrative regions down to ten nations: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, 
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Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. These nations all had DHS surveys 
collected at two or more time points within the 1997-2013 window, and also had recorded values 
for the majority of the questions which address access to healthcare indicators. Because not all 
countries in Africa where DHS had available data for my explanatory variables, I was not able to 
leave selection of countries for study up to random assignment. That said, the vast number of 
administrative regions in this sample and the varying degrees of development and conflict among 
the ten nations make for a mixed sample population. I ultimately compile a dataset containing a 
total number of observations representing 1598 region-years. 
 For control variables, I pulled information from the United Nations Data Repository  for 98
statistics such as GDP/capita (available per year per country), Percentage of Population Living in 
Rural Areas (%, available in five year estimates), and GINI coefficients for resource distribution 
equality (available in five year increments). I also incorporated national statistics for ethnic 
fractionalization using data replicated from a study composed by Fearon and Laitin in 2003. 
These statistics range from zero to one, such that a higher number indicates a higher probability 
that two individuals drawn at random are from different ethnolinguistic groups (i.e., higher level 
of ethnic fractionalization). 
 Though I was able to find reliable and standardized data for all of my variables and 
controls of interest, there are limitations of these statistics. First, as not all variables are coded at 
the subnational level, the accuracy of any model I run to predict the onset or intensity of civil 
conflict will not reflect the true nature of that region completely. Some of the variation across 
regions gets lost when you use aggregate statistics. However, as my main explanatory variables 
(healthcare indicators) response variables (conflict events), and some control variables are coded 
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at the subnational level, this suggests that the loss of accuracy from using national statistics will 
be minimized. Second, as there are years where data were not collected during the time span of 
1997-2013, I had to choose between dropping values for missing years and carrying the most 
recent statistic for my indicators through to the next survey iteration. In choosing the latter, I was 
able to create a more full data panel, and thus, one which is more “strongly balanced;” however, 
this stability is inflated by the fact that many observations are repeated across multiple years. I 
take this into account when running regressions and interpreting results in the next chapter. 
!
!
!
!
!
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!
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!
!
!
!
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Chapter 5: Methods, Regressions and Analysis 
!!!!!!!!
Using the long panel I created using the DHS, ACLED, UN and WHO data, I focus primarily on 
three models to test for a relationship between access to healthcare and the number and intensity 
of civil conflicts at the subnational level using STATA 13. After discussing descriptive statistics 
for the data and implications of matched pairs correlations between the explanatory and response 
variables, I discuss the three models I could use to test this relationship—pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression, poisson regression, and negative binomial regressions.  I ultimately 
settle on using negative binomial regressions, clustered by administrative region to yield robust 
standard errors. In the sections that follow, I discuss the logic behind using each model and 
interpret the outputs from each.  
!
5.1 Descriptive Statistics & Initial Correlations 
!
In total, the panel contains observations for 1598 region-years, spanning 94 distinct 
administrative regions in ten countries in Africa. Observations are recorded for years from 1997 
to 2013, the entire range in the case of some administrative regions, but not all 94 of them, as the 
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DHS surveys were not all conducted in 1997 for each country studied. Table 4  offers the 99
descriptive statistics for all variables observed in the panel. 
!
TABLE 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF PANEL VARIABLES
Variable Variable Name Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year YEAR 1598 2005 4.900513 1997 2013
Country NATION 1598 5.106383 3.044845 1 10
Administrative Region ADMIN 1598 47.5 27.14242 1 94
Number of Conflicts NUMCONF 1598 5.813517 17.89149 0 213
Number of Non-violent 
Conflict Events CTYPE11 1598 .3904881 1.840261 0 27
Number of Violent, Non-
battle Conflict Events CTYPE12 1598 4.251564 15.58797 0 208
Number of Battle Conflict 
Events CTYPE13 1598 1.183354 5.823176 0 85
Number of Fatalities (per 
region per year) FATALITIES 1598 18.3204 129.5981 0 2742
Needing Permission seek 
Healthcare PERMISSION 1079 4.797908 2.061149 .3268945 7.977431
Is cost a barrier to 
healthcare COSTBARR 1079 7.235118 1.558454 2.817355 9.769965
Distance to a health facility DIST 1079 6.652097 1.673087 .9259259 9.275037
Do you need transportation 
to get to a health facility TRANS 921 6.479716 1.834034 .8024691 9.245142
Concern about going alone CRGOALONE 1079 5.544096 1.969778 .7760331 8.730493
Concern about there 
ebeing no female provider CRNOFEM 871 5.40731 2.187806 .6038961 9.206037
Concern about there being 
no provider at all CRNOPROV 279 7.441532 .961655 5.315688 8.909735
Concern about there being 
no medication CRNOMEDS 329 7.4629 1.268164 1.739521 9.073451
Who has final say in 
healthcare decsions DECISION 1145 13.93678 1.713329 10.42126 17.14568
Insurance Coverage INSCOVER 475 .0879909 .1503091 0 .5958084
Percentage of Population 
living in Rural areas PRURAL 1394 71.40344 9.068377 56.6 86.9
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!
In order to get a better sense of how the variables of interest, namely access to healthcare 
variables, correlate to the response variables, I conducted matched pairs correlations, selecting 
options for STATA to produce the significance levels of each correlation and the number of 
observations used to compute it. Matched pairs correlations differ from regular correlations in 
that matched pairs correlations only compute the correlation for observations where there are 
populated values for each variable being compared. Since not all regions have data for all 
variables in all time periods, a regular correlation would reduce the number of observations 
included in the computation to 30 out of a potential 1598. Table 5 presents this output.  
!
!
Physicians per 1,000 
population PHYS 1031 .0684462 .0499768 .019 .29
Hospital Beds per 10,000 
population BEDS 661 12.76551 14.19959 1 63
Access to electricity ELECTRIC 1151 .239377 .2366105 0 .9857988
Highest education level EDU 1146 .8520262 .5157016 .1131347 1.952341
Ethnic Fractionalization EFRAC 1598 .6333058 .2372894 .1412686 .861482
Level of Democracy POLITY 1598 3.295369 4.168236 -6 9
Income per capita GDPCAP 1598 499.2497 289.5921 117 1605
(Un)Equal Resource 
Distribution statistic GINI 1050 42.14667 7.468254 30.8 57.5
TABLE 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF PANEL VARIABLES
Variable Variable Name Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
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TABLE 5: MATCHED PAIR CORRELATIONS 
HEALTHCARE INDICATORS & DOMESTIC CONFLICT
Element of Access Indicator Number of Conflicts
Number 
of Non-
Violent 
Conflict 
Events
Number of 
Violent, 
Non-Battle 
Conflict 
Events
Number 
of Battle 
Events
Number of 
Fatalities
AFFORDABILITY
Cost as a Perceived 
Barrier
-0.0618 
0.0423* 
1079
0.0487 
0.1102 
1079
-0.1436 
0.0000† 
1079
0.1801 
0.0000† 
1079
0.1521 
0.0000† 
1079
Insurance Coverage -0.0330 
0.4726 
475
-0.0713 
0.1206 
475
0.0150 
0.7445 
475
-0.1074 
0.0193* 
475
-0.1100 
0.0165* 
475
AVAILABILITY
Concern about there not 
a provider at the facility
-0.2411 
0.0000† 
279
-0.0819 
0.1724 
279
-0.3923 
0.0000† 
279
0.2836 
0.0000† 
279
0.2562 
0.0000† 
279
Concern about there not 
being medication at the 
facility
0.0478 
0.3874 
329
0.0444 
0.4221 
329
-0.0421 
0.4469 
329
0.2119 
0.0001† 
329
0.1933 
0.0004† 
329
ACCESSIBILITY
Distance to a facility -0.0777 
0.0107* 
1079
0.0378 
0.2146 
1079
-0.1644 
0.0000† 
1079
0.1927 
0.0000† 
1079
0.1765 
0.0000† 
1079
Needing to seek 
transport to get to a 
facility
-0.0396 
0.2296 
921
0.0595 
0.0709 
921
-0.1396 
0.0000† 
921
0.2345 
0.0000† 
921
0.9843 
0.0000† 
921
ACCOMMODATION
Number of physicians 
per 1,000 population
0.1432 
0.0000
1031
-0.0037 
.9046 
1031
0.1868 
0.0000
1031
-0.0783 
0.0119* 
1031
-0.0918 
0.0032** 
1031
Number of hospital beds 
per 10,000 population
0.1787 
0.0000
661
0.0842 
0.0304* 
661
0.1768 
0.0000
661
0.0780 
0.0451* 
661
0.0534 
0.1701 
661
ACCEPTABILITY
Concern about there not 
being a female medical 
provider at a facility
-0.0739 
0.0293* 
871
0.0543 
0.1094 
871
-0.1894 
0.0000† 
871
0.2649 
0.0000† 
871
0.2321 
0.0000† 
871
SOCIAL ACCESS
Needing Permission to 
Seek Healthcare
-0.0643 
0.0346* 
1079
0.0705 
0.0205* 
1079
-0.1525 
0.0000† 
1079
0.1901 
0.0000† 
1079
0.1531 
0.0000† 
1079
Who has final say over 
health decisions
0.1326 
0.0000† 
1145
0.0520 
0.0785 
1145
0.1635 
0.0000† 
1145
-0.0530 
0.0728 
1145
-0.0123 
0.6781 
1145
Concern about going 
alone to healthcare 
facility
-0.0534 
0.0794 
1079
0.0505 
0.0974 
1079
-0.1495 
0.0000† 
1079
0.2230 
0.0000† 
1079
0.1966 
0.0000† 
1079
* significant at p = 0.05 
** significant at p = 0.01 
† significant at p = 0.001
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Statistically Significant Positive Correlations 
!
The matched pairs correlations indicate that there are statistically significant positive corrections 
between the number of battle events and the number of fatalities for at least one indicator of each 
element of access. All of these, with the exception of the correlations for accommodation 
indicators and the conflict response variables, make logical sense. For affordability indicators, as 
cost to go to a health facility becomes more of a problem the number of battle events and 
fatalities is also expected to increase. For availability indicators, the greater the concern that 
there will be no provider or medication at the facility, the greater the number of battle events and 
fatalities is expected to be. This same expectation can be said as distance to a facility, needing to 
seek transport to get to a facility, concern about there not being a female medical provider at the 
facility, needing permission to seek healthcare and concern about going to a facility alone all 
become more problematic for patients. The correlation between needing transport to seek 
healthcare and the number of fatalities is extremely strong (r = 0.9843) suggesting that there is 
an extremely strong, positive relationship between these variables. These correlations are all 
statistically significant at the p<0.001 level, suggesting there is greater than a 99.9% chance 
these correlations are not random. These provide initial support for hypothesis 2b. 
 There also appears to be statistically positive correlations between the accommodation 
indicators and conflict response variables, as well as the decision-making indicator of social 
access and conflict responses, which at first may not appear to make sense. For accommodation, 
the greater the number of physicians per 1,000 population, the greater the expected number of 
conflict events (any type) and violent, non-battle conflict events should be. This correlation is the 
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same for the number of hospital beds per 10,000 population for all conflict response variables 
except for number of fatalities, and both are significant at the p<0.05 level. Upon reflection, 
these patterns are reasonable. Because these are correlations, not predictive values, it is logical 
that in areas where number of conflicts is greater, and where more violent conflict occurs, there 
will likely be more doctors and more beds for patients. This could reflect the responsiveness of 
states to concentrate infrastructure and public services in areas of highest need, or  could reflect 
the presence of outside actors offering services in conflict affected areas. The accommodation 
statistics I used from the WHO Global Health Observatory do not discriminate where the 
physicians or the or the beds come from.  
 Other positive correlations which may not immediately make sense include that between 
needing permission to seek healthcare and the number of non-violent conflict events (significant 
at p<0.05), and that between level of autonomy in decision-making about health, the total 
number of conflicts, and the number of violent, non-battle conflict events (both significant at 
p<0.001). The correlation concerning permission has a weak coefficient (r =  0.0705) suggesting 
it is very close to zero in actuality. Nevertheless, it could reflect issues of social grievance—as 
social norms require patients to obtain permission before they seek healthcare, they may be 
inclined to express their discontent through non-violent means. Permission may not be a 
significant factor to incite violent civil conflict. Further, the relationship between autonomy in 
decision-making and total conflict and number of violent, non-battle events may imply that when 
conflict is high and violence is prevalent, the relative importance of who has the final on health 
matters is less of an issue for respondents to DHS surveys. Alternatively, it could suggest that as 
people have more control over their access to healthcare, they may demand more from service 
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providers and could even engage in protests or riots to convey these demands. Lastly, because 
the number of violent, non-battle conflict events comprise a large portion of the total number of 
conflicts, it makes sense why these two response variables correlate in similar ways to these 
healthcare indicators.  
!
Statistically Significant Negative Correlations 
!
The initial correlations reveal some statistically significant negative relationships between access 
indicators and conflict as well. Namely, for the number of violent, non-battle conflict events and 
the total number of conflict events, the data suggest that these conflict responses will go down as 
access to healthcare becomes more problematic in terms of cost barriers, concern about there not 
being a provider, distance to a facility, concern about there being no female provider, and 
needing permission to seek healthcare. These results, all significant at the p < 0.05 level, seem 
contrary to hypothesis 1b. However, upon reflection, these too make sense. As numbers of 
violent conflict are greater, relatively speaking barriers to healthcare may be seen as less of a 
problem as other more tangible threats to safety and security. While they do not support the 
direction of my argument, these correlations may capture the interaction effect that conflict has 
on access to healthcare.  
 One negative correlation does support hypothesis 2b, however. As insurance coverage 
increases, the number of battle events and the number of fatalities is expected to decrease 
(significant at p < 0.05). As more people are covered by insurance, they are more likely to get 
medical care and treatment they may need if hurt during conflict. Alternatively, if access to 
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services is low, they may be less inclined to join forces and overthrow the current regime through 
battle events.  
!
5.2 Regression Models 
!
Surveying the descriptive statistics of the data, I settle on three potential regression models I 
could use to explore this relationship: pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), poisson, and negative 
binomial regressions. A simple OLS model is one of the easiest models to compose to test for 
any linearity in the relationship between these explanatory and response variables. Because the 
panel of data used contains observations of many cross-sectional units (administrative regions) at 
different points in time (time series), it is appropriate to use a pooled OLS model.  A regular OLS 
model looks at the relationship between explanatory and response variables which are static; 
pooled OLS accounts for the influence of time on the regression results. Investigating the 
appropriateness of this model for the conflict outcome variables, however, reveals that this 
relationship may not be modeled best through a linear model.  
 For example, below is the residuals plot for the response variable, number of battle 
events, given explanatory variables costbarr and inscover, as well as all controls. Residuals are 
the difference between the predicted value of the response variable given the regression being 
modeled and the observed statistic. Large residuals reflect a difference between the suggested 
relationship of the model between the variables and the actual observations used in the dataset. If 
an OLS model was appropriate, the plot of residuals would be randomly distributed and have no 
discernible pattern.  
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RESIDUALS PLOT: BATTLE EVENTS  
 
Clearly this is not the case. The residuals plot for battle events has an observable positive, linear 
pattern. This suggests that the pooled OLS model attempting to explain the influence of 
explanatory variables costbarr and inscover and the control on predicting the number of battle 
events does not capture all the key influences that produce conflict. Insofar as the predictive 
ability and statistical significances of the coefficients produced by the model are concerned, the 
pooled OLS model again is ineffective in modeling this relationship. The table below, Results 1, 
presents an output from a pooled OLS testing this relationship, incorporating robust standard 
errors clustered by administrative region. OLS models treat observations as if each is 
independent from the next, and therefore not correlated with others in the sample. This is 
certainly not the case for this data, as new battles are not always independent of past battles, and 
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regions affected by conflict may likely experience more conflict. Clustering around variables 
helps models account for and minimize intra-group correlation of observations. I cluster by 
administrative region because this is the unit of analysis where I look for variation in access to 
healthcare on the resulting level of battle events (in this regression). Controlling for the influence 
that one conflict event will have on subsequent conflict events in each administrative region is an 
important element of any model that seeks to identify the impact that healthcare indicators have 
on explaining conflict. 
!
xtreg ctype13 costbarr inscover electric prural edu efrac polity gdpcap gini, cluster (admin) !
Random-effects GLS regression                       Number of obs          =     349 
Group variable: admin                                       Number of groups      =       60 !
R-sq:  within  = 0.0111                             Obs per group: min   =         3 
       between = 0.1570                                             avg    =      5.8 
       overall = 0.1239                                             max   =       11 
    
                                                     Wald chi2(9)           =      9.09 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                          Prob > chi2          =    0.4286 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 60 clusters in admin) !
RESULTS 1 
POOLED OLS: AFFORDABILITY INDICATORS ON BATTLE EVENTS
CTYPE13 COEFFICIENT
ROBUST 
STANDARD 
ERROR
Z-SCORE P> |Z|
95% 
CONFIDENCE 
INTERVAL
COSTBARR .084318 .604093 0.14 0.889 -1.099683    
1.268319
INSCOVER -2.944667 2.630049 -1.12 0.263
-8.099468 
2.210134
ELECTRIC -5.644067    5.05695   -1.12 0.264 -15.55551    
4.267374
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Though I employ clustering effects on this model, I find that none of the explanatory variables 
are statistically significant, even though the initial correlations suggested otherwise. Further, a 
post-estimation test was conducted to see if the results are biased due to missing variables. The 
results indicated that in fact this model is skewed due to missing variables (Appendix, Ramsey 
Reset Test for Results 1). Though I was able to populate data into the panel using the most recent 
statistics for each indicator for many cases, it appears there is still insufficient data to make use 
of a pooled OLS model.  
 Given the shortcomings of the pooled OLS model, I turn towards two other models which 
may be more appropriate for modeling these relationships: poisson and negative binomial 
PRURAL -.2780169 0.1871961 -1.49 0.138            -.6449145 
.0888807
EDU .7095649 3.365976 0.21 0.833 -5.887626    
7.306756
EFRAC -18.13896  14.47954     -1.25   0.210    -46.51835    
10.24042
POLITY .3441243 .2927514 1.18 0.240 -.2296578  
.9179065
GDPCAP -.0003113   .0016657    -0.19   0.852     -.003576    
.0029535
GINI -.9404599   .5654904    -1.66   0.096    -2.04880 
.1678808
_CONS 73.6246   46.77164     1.57   0.115    -18.04613    
165.2953
RESULTS 1 
POOLED OLS: AFFORDABILITY INDICATORS ON BATTLE EVENTS
COEFFICIENT
ROBUST 
STANDARD 
ERROR
Z-SCORE P> |Z|
95% 
CONFIDENCE 
INTERVAL
CTYPE13
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regressions.These two models are specifically useful for response variables that are “counts.” 
Count variables indicate how many times something has happened, such as the number of 
violent, non-battle events that occur in an administrative region, or the number of fatalities that 
take place in a region. Linear models such as the OLS have been used to estimate count 
variables, but as we have seen there are problems trying to offer predictive values for outcome 
variables that are unbiased and reasonable. Thus, poisson and negative binomial regressions may 
offer a better alternative to OLS. Poisson models examine the relationship between the expected 
count of an outcome variable, and the probability of observing any expected count. This is 
potentially a better model for the relationship I am testing because outputs can help us predict 
what the count of the outcome variable (e.g. number of conflicts) will be given explanatory 
variables like healthcare indicators.  
 A related count regression model, the negative binomial regression, takes the poisson 
model a bit further and accounts for observed heterogeneity among sample members. This is 
useful because this model accounts for differences in the administrative regions being analyzed 
while it tries to predict the number of conflict events we should see given healthcare access and 
control variables. When regressing outcome and explanatory variables using poisson and 
negative binomial regressions, I conduct post estimation tests to see which model is more 
appropriate for modeling the dataset I have created. An example of this process follows, as I use 
both poisson and negative binomial regressions to  predict the number of battle events (ctype13) 
given concern that there is not a provider at a health facility (crnoprov) and concern about there 
being no medication at a facility (crnomeds).  
!
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poisson ctype13 crnoprov crnomeds  prural edu electric efrac polity gdpcap gini, vce (cl admin) 
Poisson regression                                        Number of obs   =        229 
                                                           Wald chi2(9)    =     164.21 
                                                             Prob > chi2     =    0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -932.53538                         Pseudo R2       =     0.4702 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 30 clusters in admin) !
poisgof !
Deviance goodness-of-fit =  1551.453    Pearson goodness-of-fit  =  3987.765 !
Prob > chi2(219)         =    0.0000           Prob > chi2(219)         =    0.0000 !
!
RESULTS 2 
POISSON: AVAILABILITY INDICATORS ON BATTLE EVENTS
CTYPE13 COEFFICIENT
ROBUST 
STANDARD 
ERROR
Z-SCORE P> |Z|
95% 
CONFIDENCE 
INTERVAL
CRNOPROV 1.255858 .4915037 2.56 0.011 .2925289    2.219188
CRNOMEDS -.9029587 .3019407 -2.99 0.003 -1.494752 -.3111659
ELECTRIC 1.378662 2.340452 0.59 0.556 -3.20854    5.965865
PRURAL -.2220856 .0852661 -2.60 0.009 -.389204 -.0549671
EDU -4.466397 1.79073 -2.49 0.013 -7.976163    -.9566309
EFRAC 320.1333 112.9652 2.83 0.005 98.72561    541.5409
POLITY .1091256 .0619456 1.76 0.078 -.0122855     .2305366
GDPCAP -.0015996 .0007702 -2.08 0.038 -.0031091    -.0000901
GINI -2.683727 .8798359 -3.05 0.002 -4.408174    -.9592805
_CONS -140.5069 58.02409 -2.42 0.015 -254.232   -26.78178
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nbreg ctype13 crnoprov crnomeds  prural edu electric efrac polity gdpcap gini, vce (cl admin) 
Negative binomial regression                              Number of obs   =        229 
Dispersion = mean                                  Wald chi2(9)    =      42.01 
Log pseudolikelihood = -405.53667                          Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
(Std. Err. adjusted for 30 clusters in admin) !
!
The results of the poisson regression seem promising. There are seven statistically significant 
explanatory variables captured by the model. However, the large value of the chi-squared 
RESULTS 3 
NEGATIVE BINOMIAL: AVAILABILITY INDICATORS ON BATTLE EVENTS
CTYPE13 COEFFICIENT
ROBUST 
STANDARD 
ERROR
Z-SCORE P> |Z|
95% 
CONFIDENCE 
INTERVAL
CRNOPROV -.0218103 .6134717 -0.04 0.972 -1.224193    1.180572
CRNOMEDS -.2000094 .310748 -0.64 0.520 -.8090642    .4090454
ELECTRIC .5848734   2.959818     0.20   0.843    -5.216264     6.38601
PRURAL -.3108568 .1045169 -2.97 0.003 -.5157061    -.1060075
EDU -2.636148 1.648615 -1.60 0.110 -5.867375     .5950791
EFRAC 145.5001   128.4882     1.13   0.257 -106.3321    397.3322
POLITY .0629923 .0862018 0.73 0.465 -.10596 .2319447
GDPCAP -.0019609 .0006891 -2.85  0.004          -.0033115   -.0006102
GINI -1.531075 1.045479  -1.46 0.143          -3.580176    .5180255
_CONS -32.23965 64.75016 -0.50 0.619 -159.1476    94.66833
/lnalpha 1.307027 .1953284 .9241908    1.689864
alpha 3.695173 .7217722 2.519828    5.418744
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statistic produced by the poisson goodness-of-fit (poisgof) post-estimation command indicates 
that the poisson model is not appropriate for this data. A large chi-squared value that is 
statistically significant well below the p < 0.05 level, as we see here, suggests that there is a 
degree of over dispersion in the data that the poisson model is not picking up.  
 Turning to the results of the negative binomial regression, we see that there are less 
statistically significant variables produced by the model. However, when checking for the 
goodness-of-fit of this model for the data being regressed, it is important to see an alpha score 
that is not zero. As this is the case, I must take this model to be the more appropriate count 
regression model than the poisson regression. Additionally, I plotted the predicted values for 
count of battle events per the negative binomial regression along with the observed count of 
battle events in the dataset. As the two curves are nearly identical, this affirms my decision that 
the negative binomial regression is a good fit for modeling this dataset.  
 
                 !!
          !!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Seeing as the negative binomial regression, clustered by administrative regions, is a model with a 
good fit for the data, I use this formula to test for a relationship between each of the elements of 
access to healthcare and the various conflict outcomes controlling for the variables I discuss 
previously. The results of these regressions are in the tables in the Appendix. Overall, the  results 
are mixed. Hypothesis 1a was largely supported; with the exception of accessibility and 
acceptability indicators, and one social access indicator, there were no statistically significant 
predictive effects of access to healthcare variables on the number of conflicts that take place in 
subnational administrative regions in this sample.  
 Those indicators that are statistically significant per this model only partially support 
hypothesis 1b. As the distance to get to a healthcare facility becomes more of a problem by one 
unit, it is predicted by the model that the log of the number of conflicts will decrease by a value 
of 1.071. This supports the initial correlation between these variables. This may suggest that as 
individuals are further from health facilities, they are less likely to engage in conflict because 
they are also faced with shortage of other public services/infrastructure. This lack of access may 
just be the status quo, and thus not something worth fighting about. The regression output for this 
situation also shows that as the percentage of the population living in rural areas rises, there is a 
statistically significant decrease in conflict. These two variables may go hand-in-hand, 
suggesting that the number of conflict events is lower in largely rural areas, and that these areas 
may have less healthcare facilities close-by.  
 Another statistically significant indicator, role in decision-making, matches the initial 
correlation. As the regional average score for autonomy in decision-making increases, the log of 
the number of conflicts is predicted to increase by .3457. Again, this may reflect that as more 
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people feel empowered to seek healthcare and take health into their own hands, they may be 
inclined to speak or act out if the services provided are inadequate. Lastly, two indicators were 
found to be statistically significant in this model that were not initially correlated with this 
conflict response variable—needing transport to seek healthcare and concern about there not 
being a female provider. As both needing transport and concerns that there will not be a female 
provider at a health facility become more problematic, the log of the number of conflicts is 
predicted to increase. These indicators for the accessibility and acceptability of healthcare may 
indicate that if healthcare services offered do not meet the needs of the patients, individuals may 
be incensed enough to voice their grievances.  
 I personally have seen this in the work that I conduct with a marginalized community 
outside of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. This particular community is located on the 
fringes of the capital district, in an area where basic infrastructure exists but public healthcare 
facilities are over miles away from the community and hard to access without private 
transportation. As many of the people who need healthcare most in this community are elderly 
individuals, it is hard for them to walk to the facility or to leave young children for long periods 
of time to make the journey if they can get a ride. This is a point of tension for many community 
members, and has been an especially hot topic of discussion at community meetings I have 
witnessed when local government officials are present.  
 As for hypothesis 2b, we again see mixed results. As I stratified the number of conflicts 
into three groups of varying intensities (non-violent, violent but non-battle, and battle events), we 
would expect to see more violent and battle events as access to healthcare goes down. For 
predicting the number of non-violent conflict event, only the number of physicians 
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(accommodation) and needing permission (social access) were found to influence conflict at 
statistically significant levels. As the number of physicians increases, the log of the count of non-
violent conflict events is predicted to decrease by 17.7873. This supports the initial hypothesis. 
As the number of accessible doctors increases, we expect to see less conflict. There may be less 
concern or grievance about the status of healthcare that would be intense enough to prompt 
collective, non-violent action. Further, as needing permission to seek care becomes more of a 
problem (a 1 point increase on the coded scale), the  log of the number of non-violent conflict 
events is predicted to increase by 1.1268. This too seems to support the logic of the grievance 
argument. As the barriers to access to healthcare increase—here a social access barrier gets 
bigger—individuals may become frustrated enough to express their concerns publicly through 
non-violent action.  
 The next level of conflict intensity is the count of violent, non-battle events (e.g. riots/
protests, violence against civilians). Again, needing permission to seek healthcare has a positive 
and statistically significant relationship when predicting the log of the count of these events. As 
needing permission becomes more problematic, the log of the predicted number of counts of 
violent, non-battle conflicts increases by .4842. This may reflect that if social access barriers are 
intense enough, individuals who may have initially expressed grievances in non-violent ways 
may escalate to violence. Protests could become violent riots, as was the case in China when 
frustrations about the government’s response to the AIDS scandal was minimal and evasive. 
Another social access indicator, role in decision-making, was found to be statistically significant. 
As individuals have more autonomy in their health decisions, we expect to see an increase in the 
log of violent, non-battle conflicts. This supports the initial theory that patients who have more 
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control over their healthcare decisions may grow to vocalize more of their demands from service 
providers, even through protests or riots if their expectations are not met. 
 Other indicators which were found to have statistically significant inverse relationships to 
the log of the count of violent, non-battle conflicts are distance to a facility, needing transport to 
get to a facility (accessibility), and the number of physicians (accommodation). As for the 
accessibility indicators, when issues related to travel to healthcare services become more 
problematic, the model suggests we will see fewer violent, non-battle conflicts. This may reflect 
that travel issues are not enough of problems to incite violent riots or protests. It may be the case 
that travel issues, in tandem with other access issues, may provoke violent action by dissatisfied 
patients, but that alone these issues are not sufficient to cause increased conflict. Lastly, the 
greater the number of physicians, the less likely we are to see violent, non-battle conflicts. This 
seems logical and may support the state capacity argument for civil conflict. As the capacity of 
the state to accommodate its patients increases, we see less riots and protests as a result.  
 The third level of intensity for conflict events is battle events. These events all occur 
within the context of civil war. The negative binomial models indicate that as concerns about 
there not being a female provider at a facility become more problematic, and patients’ level of 
autonomy in healthcare decision-making increase, the log of the count of battle events should 
rise. As concern about there being a female provider at a facility proxies the acceptability of 
healthcare services, this positive relationship may suggest that individuals may seek to replace 
regimes that offer unacceptable healthcare services. The state may not have the capacity to 
employ properly acceptable health professionals, or it may not prioritize making healthcare (and 
other services for that matter) acceptable for the majority of its constituency. In cases like these, 
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it may be enough that citizens band together and work to overthrow that government which is 
failing them. Furthermore, if individuals have more autonomy in healthcare decision-making,  it 
may reflect a degree of social flexibility and freedom of expression. If people have stronger 
opinions about and desires for their healthcare system, but that system is not proving acceptable, 
more social freedoms may give citizens the room to collect and organize to challenge the 
government and install one that will meet their needs. 
 The last measure of conflict intensity investigated in this study is the number of conflict 
related fatalities. The model produced indicates that as the number of beds increases the log of 
the number of fatalities will decrease. This is a good conclusion to see, as we would hope that the 
more spaces and infrastructural units there are to care for patients, less people will die in conflict 
affected states. Additionally, we see that the more autonomy people share in decision-making, 
the greater the log of the count of fatalities should be. This may not seem logical at first, but it 
can extend the conclusion about the positive relationship between this variable and the number of 
battle events. If autonomy in decision-making leads to more battle events, it may well follow that 
more people will die as a result of larger, war-type conflicts.  
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Conclusions & Future Directions 
!!!!!!!!
In sum, the results produced by the negative binomial regression comparing access to healthcare 
indicators, control variables, and measures of civil conflict are mixed. Accessibility, 
Acceptability, Accommodation, and Social Access elements of “access to healthcare” seem to 
matter for predicting the number of and intensity of conflict events, though these relationships do 
not always move in the same direction. Issues with accessibility of healthcare, at least for this 
population of regions sampled, do not incite more conflict. Social access elements of access to 
healthcare, however, are positively associated with conflict. This conclusion supports the 
grievance argument that frustrations about healthcare access and the social norms which 
influence access to healthcare may be enough to prompt civil conflict increasing in sheer 
magnitude and intensity. Last, we see the good sign that better capacity for states to 
accommodate patients, a reflection of greater state capacity, should dampen conflict. This, too, 
supports the idea that stronger and more capable states will see less violence.  
 While this initial research suggests that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between access to healthcare and civil conflict, this is only the first step of many that can be 
taken to define this interaction further. Given my capabilities with statistical modeling, I was able 
to employ an appropriate negative binomial regression to this dataset, using clustering by 
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administrative regions to produce robust standard errors and correct for any intraregional 
correlation of conflict events within this dataset. However, this model can be improved by 
conducting a time-series negative binomial model. The model I use only looks at each 
observation at a static point in time, therefore not accounting for the influence that unique, fixed 
effects within the administrative regions have on conflict outcomes across the entire span of 17 
years for which I have data. A time series negative binomial regression will take this missing 
factor into account, and may provide more accurate statistic relationship between these variables.  
 Other researchers  have employed logit models and time-series logit models to measure 100
the impact of explanatory variables on conflict outcomes. These models may be appropriate to 
test out in the future, but given the time and data constraints of an undergraduate thesis, I was 
unable to complete these. A recent study examining the impact of economic deprivation using 
indicators from DHS surveys relied upon GIS methodologies to examine the spatial element of 
DHS data and conflict outcomes.  This method could also be employed, and would perhaps 101
improve the estimation of relationships between accessibility indicators and conflicts. Lastly, 
future research into this question will have to examine the interaction and reverse causality 
effects that conflict has on access to healthcare. 
 Overall, this thesis begins the discussion of the role that access to healthcare plays in 
predicting civil conflict. Though results are mixed, it is exciting to see that there are statistically 
significant relationships between healthcare access indicators and measures for civil conflict, at 
least in conflict affected states in Africa from 1997-2013. The logic of these relationships also 
tracks along major paradigms in the conflict literature. Hopefully the conclusions of this study 
will spark greater exchange of insights across the public health and political science disciplines. 
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Healthcare, something that is largely influenced by the needs and particularities of individual 
nations, is not standardized across the globe. Beyond that, the normative rhetoric about the 
importance of health for security or national stability too often falls short of action. If this thesis 
can prompt further study into the impact that access to healthcare has on something which many 
policymakers are concerned with—preventing civil conflict—we may just find that the two are 
linked. If so, this link may encourage future leaders to make access to healthcare a top priority on 
their agendas, improving social welfare, population health and civil peace in the process. 
!
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Appendix 
!!!!!!!!
Results: Ramsey Reset Test for Results 1  !
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of ctype13 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 336) =     26.88 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 !
The Prob > F value of 0.0000 indicates there is greater than a 99.99% chance that this model 
has omitted values. The pooled OLS model is not a good fit for the data.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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OVERALL RESULTS 
HYPOTHESIS 1B
NEGATIVE BINOMIAL: ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE ON TOTAL NUMBER OF 
CONFLICTS
Element of Access Definition Coefficient P Value Observations
AFFORDABILITY
Cost as a Perceived 
Barrier*
0.1712 0.623 349
Percent of Population with 
Insurance Coverage
-1.555 0.417 349
AVAILABILITY
Concern about there not a 
provider at the facility*
-0.1221 0.789 229
Concern about there not 
being medication at the 
facility*
0.1001 0.745 229
ACCESSIBILITY
Distance to a facility* -1.071 0.024 631
Needing to seek transport 
to get to a facility*
0.9276 0.043 631
ACCOMMODATION
Number of physicians per 
1,000 population
-3.834 0.120 419
Number of hospital beds 
per 10,000 population
-0.0032 0.280 419
ACCEPTABILITY
Concern about there not 
being a female medical 
provider at a facility*
0.1918 0.018 581
SOCIAL ACCESS
Needing Permission to 
Seek Healthcare*
0.4769 0.092 776
Who has final say over 
health decisions**
0.3457 0.000 776
Concern about going alone 
to healthcare facility*
-0.3568 0.239 776
*Coded such that a higher score indicates that this is more of a problem when seeking healthcare 
**Coded such that a higher score indicates more autonomy in decision-making about healthcare needs 
Significant at the p < .05 level
Code in STATA 13: nbreg [numconf] [indicators for each element of access] [all controls], vce (cl admin)
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OVERALL RESULTS 
HYPOTHESIS 2Bi
NEGATIVE BINOMIAL: ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE ON NON-VIOLENT 
CONFLICTS
Element of Access Definition Coefficient P Value Observations
AFFORDABILITY
Cost as a Perceived 
Barrier*
0.1257 0.692 349
Percent of Population with 
Insurance Coverage
-2.4537 0.366 349
AVAILABILITY
Concern about there not a 
provider at the facility*
-0.2039 0.741 229
Concern about there not 
being medication at the 
facility*
0.7082 0.851 229
ACCESSIBILITY
Distance to a facility* -1.0501 0.378 631
Needing to seek transport 
to get to a facility*
1.3778 0.232 631
ACCOMMODATION
Number of physicians per 
1,000 population
-17.7873 0.006 419
Number of hospital beds 
per 10,000 population
0.0105 0.103 419
ACCEPTABILITY
Concern about there not 
being a female medical 
provider at a facility*
0.2809 0.212 581
SOCIAL ACCESS
Needing Permission to 
Seek Healthcare*
1.1268 0.034 776
Who has final say over 
health decisions**
0.2690 0.079 776
Concern about going alone 
to healthcare facility*
-0.7321 0.201 776
*Coded such that a higher score indicates that this is more of a problem when seeking healthcare 
**Coded such that a higher score indicates more autonomy in decision-making about healthcare needs 
Significant at the p < .05 level
Code in STATA 13: nbreg [ctype11] [indicators for each element of access] [all controls], vce (cl admin)
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OVERALL RESULTS 
HYPOTHESIS 2Bii
NEGATIVE BINOMIAL: ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE ON VIOLENT, NON-BATTLE  
CONFLICTS
Element of Access Definition Coefficient P Value Observations
AFFORDABILITY
Cost as a Perceived 
Barrier*
0.2958 0.162 349
Percent of Population with 
Insurance Coverage
-0.6857 0.701 349
AVAILABILITY
Concern about there not a 
provider at the facility*
-0.3719 0.406 229
Concern about there not 
being medication at the 
facility*
0.2774 0.377 229
ACCESSIBILITY
Distance to a facility* -1.6554 0.000 631
Needing to seek transport 
to get to a facility*
1.5146 0.001 631
ACCOMMODATI
ON
Number of physicians per 
1,000 population
-5.9698 0.000 419
Number of hospital beds 
per 10,000 population
0.0010 0.866 419
ACCEPTABILITY
Concern about there not 
being a female medical 
provider at a facility*
0.1220 0.095 581
SOCIAL ACCESS
Needing Permission to 
Seek Healthcare*
0.4842 0.050 776
Who has final say over 
health decisions**
0.2260 0.005 776
Concern about going alone 
to healthcare facility*
-0.4365 0.108 776
*Coded such that a higher score indicates that this is more of a problem when seeking healthcare 
**Coded such that a higher score indicates more autonomy in decision-making about healthcare needs 
Significant at the p < .05 level
Code in STATA 13: nbreg [ctype12] [indicators for each element of access] [all controls], vce (cl admin)
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OVERALL RESULTS 
HYPOTHESIS 2Biii
NEGATIVE BINOMIAL: ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE ON BATTLE  CONFLICTS
Element of Access Definition Coefficient P Value Observations
AFFORDABILITY
Cost as a Perceived 
Barrier*
0.5214 0.423 349
Percent of Population with 
Insurance Coverage
-3.3889 0.185 349
AVAILABILITY
Concern about there not a 
provider at the facility*
-0.0218 0.972 229
Concern about there not 
being medication at the 
facility*
-0.2000 0.520 229
ACCESSIBILITY
Distance to a facility* 0.5436 0.418 631
Needing to seek transport 
to get to a facility*
-0.5393 0.397 631
ACCOMMODATION
Number of physicians per 
1,000 population
7.320 0.182 419
Number of hospital beds 
per 10,000 population
-0.0070 0.094 419
ACCEPTABILITY
Concern about there not 
being a female medical 
provider at a facility*
0.4597 0.027 581
SOCIAL ACCESS
Needing Permission to 
Seek Healthcare*
0.5010 0.234 776
Who has final say over 
health decisions**
0.4207 0.024 776
Concern about going alone 
to healthcare facility*
0.0982 0.818 776
*Coded such that a higher score indicates that this is more of a problem when seeking healthcare 
**Coded such that a higher score indicates more autonomy in decision-making about healthcare needs 
Significant at the p < .05 level
Code in STATA 13: nbreg [ctype13] [indicators for each element of access] [all controls], vce (cl admin)
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!OVERALL RESULTS 
HYPOTHESIS 2Biv
NEGATIVE BINOMIAL: ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE ON FATALITIES
Element of Access Definition Coefficient P Value Observations
AFFORDABILITY
Cost as a Perceived 
Barrier*
-0.4047 0.436 349
Percent of Population with 
Insurance Coverage
-0.7016 0.789 349
AVAILABILITY
Concern about there not a 
provider at the facility*
-0.3108 0.602 229
Concern about there not 
being medication at the 
facility*
0.0803 0.812 229
ACCESSIBILITY
Distance to a facility* -0.8917 0.181 631
Needing to seek transport 
to get to a facility*
0.4902 0.480 631
ACCOMMODATION
Number of physicians per 
1,000 population
8.339 0.215 419
Number of hospital beds 
per 10,000 population
-0.0109 0.003 419
ACCEPTABILITY
Concern about there not 
being a female medical 
provider at a facility*
0.2343 0.094 581
SOCIAL ACCESS
Needing Permission to 
Seek Healthcare*
0.0723 0.830 776
Who has final say over 
health decisions**
0.7117 0.000 776
Concern about going alone 
to healthcare facility*
0.1945 0.596 776
*Coded such that a higher score indicates that this is more of a problem when seeking healthcare 
**Coded such that a higher score indicates more autonomy in decision-making about healthcare needs 
Significant at the p < .05 level
Code in STATA 13: nbreg [fatalities] [indicators for each element of access] [all controls], vce (cl admin)
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